SUPERSTARS OR SUPERVILLAINS? LARGE FIRMS IN THE SOUTH KOREAN GROWTH MIRACLE

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Summary

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- Develop a quantitative macroeconomic model featuring:
 - Heterogeneous firm productivity and export demand (Melitz 2003)
 - Heterogeneous distortions (Hsieh and Klenow 2009)
 - · Oligopolistic and oligopsonistic competition (Atkeson and Burstein 2008; Berger et al. 2022)

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 - · Oligopolistic and oligopsonistic competition (Atkeson and Burstein 2008; Berger et al. 2022)
- Use firm-level data from South Korea to extract key primitives:
 - Productivity, distortions, export demand
- Decompose sectoral concentration into:
 - · Top-3 firms' productivity, foreign market access, top firm turnover (entry/exit), sectoral reallocation
- Quantify the contribution of top-3 firms to real GDP and welfare

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 - 57% accounted for by sectoral reallocation
 - · 43% driven by within-sector increase in the top-3 firm shares (half coming from churning)
- Ounterfactual of having the top-3 firms w/average shock process
 - Market concentration is reduced
 - Real GDP in 2011: 15% \downarrow
 - · NPV of Welfare over 1972-2011: 4%↓
 - Mostly from productivity shocks
 - \cdot Samsung Electronics: real GDP 6.4%, welfare 1.04% \downarrow ; Hyundai Motors: real GDP 1.1%, weflare 0.5% \downarrow

Comments

OVERVIEW

Super interesting & well-written paper!

- Model + data: carefully estimating firm primitives and effectively identifying the main sources of market concentration
- Quantify the implications of top-3 firms and market concentration in the macroeconomy

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Some comments:

- Validation of the Model & Estimates
- Revisiting the Counterfactual Analysis
- Output: The Role of Firm Entry and Turnover
- Ø Further Investigation of the Top Firms

$$\underbrace{\max_{\substack{y_{fj}^{H}, y_{fj}^{E}, l_{fj}^{n}, k_{fj}^{n}, m_{fj}} p_{fj}^{H} y_{fj}^{H} + p_{fj}^{F} y_{fj}^{E} - (1 + \tau_{fj}^{L}) w_{fj} l_{fj} - (1 + \tau_{fj}^{K}) \rho k_{fj} - P_{j}^{M} m_{fj}}_{\text{subject to}}}$$

$$\underbrace{y_{fj} = a_{fj} l_{fj}^{\gamma_{j}^{L}} k_{fj}^{\gamma_{j}^{N}} m_{fj}^{\gamma_{j}^{M}}}_{production}}, \quad \underbrace{y_{fj}^{H} = \frac{1}{F_{j}} (p_{fj}^{H})^{-\sigma} (p_{j}^{H})^{\sigma-\rho} P_{j}^{\rho-1} E_{j}}_{\text{domestic demand}}, \quad \underbrace{y_{fj}^{F} = (p_{fj}^{F})^{-\sigma} D_{fj}}_{\text{foreign demand}}, \quad \underbrace{l_{fj} = \frac{1}{F_{j}} w_{fj}^{-\eta} W_{j}^{\theta-\eta} W^{-\theta} L}_{\text{labor supply}}$$

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HHEEVING KNI-M


- Heterogeneous firm productivity a_{fi}
- Heterogeneous foreign demand D_{fi}
- Labor, capital distortions au_{fi}^L , au_{fi}^K

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- Heterogeneous firm productivity a_{fi}
- Heterogeneous foreign demand D_{fi}
- Labor, capital distortions τ_{fi}^L , τ_{fi}^K
- $\Rightarrow \{a_{f_i} D_{f_i}, \tau_{f_i}^L, \tau_{f_i}^K\}$ are recovered w/ the model solutions+data



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 - : any unmodeled demand or cost conditions would be misinterpreted as distortions
 - · Demand shifters, factor quality, adjustment costs
 - Heterogeneity in factor demand and elasticities


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 - · Demand shifters, factor quality, adjustment costs
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- Any relationships b/w measured $a_{fj} D_{fj}, \tau_{fj}^{L}, \tau_{fj}^{K}$?
 - · Can look into their corr. w/ firm age, size, growth, exit, etc. (by time, industry, cohort)
 - Any corr. b/w distortions & fundamentals?

(e.g., size-dependent subsidy or regulation, subsidies to exporters, etc.)

- What are τ_{fi}^L , τ_{fi}^K ? How to think about them?
 - What happened in 1980s, 2000s?
 - · Any candidates to fix our ideas?

(e.g., government interventions favoring certain firms or sectors)

• Investigate historical policy changes and their corr. w/ $au_{fi}^{
m L}, au_{fi}^{
m K}$



$\Rightarrow a_{f_i} D_{f_i}$ are effective, but not so much for $\tau_{f_i}^L, \tau_{f_i}^K$ (despite a large variation seen before)

J. Choi, A. Levchenko, D. Ruzic, Y. Shim (discussion by S.Kim) Superstars OR Supervillains? Large Firms in the South Korean Growth Miracle

Construct counterfactual growth for top-3 firms

$$X_{fjt} = (1 + \hat{X}_{jt}^{a}) X_{fj,t-1}^{c} \text{ for } x_{fjt} \in \{a_{fjt}, D_{fjt}, 1 + \tau_{fjt}^{L}, 1 + \tau_{fjt}^{K}\}$$

where $\hat{X}_{jt}^{a} = \sum_{f \in F_{jt}^{a} \cap F_{jt}^{cont,nz}} \frac{X_{fjt} - X_{fj,t-1}}{2(X_{fjt} + X_{fj,t-1})}$: unweighted avg. growth amongst continuers by age bin

What are the growth diffs. b/w top vs non-top firms?

- Previous figures compared the levels over time
- Systematically "increasing" dispersion in levels of a_{fit} , D_{fit} , but not so much for τ_{fit}^{L} , τ_{fit}^{K} ?

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- How would the sample coverage affect the imputed series and implications?
 - KIS-VALUE firms are restricted to asset>2.3 mil. USD
 - · Missing firms (mostly small) may affect the imputed growth and implication
 - · What if we consider small but productive firms?

THE ROLE OF FIRM ENTRY AND TURNOVER

Current model and analysis abstracts from firm entry or turnover

- The number of oligopolistic firms is fixed (N)
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
- The number of oligopolistic firms is fixed (N)
- No effective firm entry or exit
- · Current exercise is only through fringe firm adjustment
- How does firm entry and dynamics interact with top firm activities and market concentration?
- How would the implications be affected with endogenous firm entry and turnover?
 - ⇒ The model can extend firm entry and exit
 - ⇒ Counterfactual analysis on firm entry, exit, reallocation, and welfare through them?

FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TOP FIRMS

Who are those top-3 firms? Basic statistics?

- · Age, size, revenue, TFPR, etc.
- · By continuers, entrants, exiters
- Specific cohorts of firms? (e.g., HCI policy in 1970s)
- In specific industries?
- · Dealing with multi-industry firms?
- Any anecdotal examples about their growth or relevant policy?

FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TOP FIRMS



Heterogeneity in top firms: what drives superstars vs. supervillains vs. others?

- What is the distribution of $\{a_{fj}, D_{fj}, \tau_{fi}^L, \tau_{fi}^K\}$ across them over time?
- · What is the source of their heterogeneity and distortions?
- · Any role of industrial policy?

Conclusion

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This paper:

- Documents a novel fact about rising concentration in South Korea
- Recover firm primitives & disentangle the part attributing to the rise in concentration
- Quantify the role of top firms in real GDP and welfare
- Conclude the rise of large firms as a positive phenomenon!

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Review:

- Promising paper: important question, tractable modeling, insightful results and implications
- Model and estimates validation need to be discussed
- Quantification analysis can be explored in depth
- Extension w/ firm entry, turnover
- Further details about top firms and summary statistics may help