

# SUPERSTARS OR SUPERVILLAINS? LARGE FIRMS IN THE SOUTH KOREAN GROWTH MIRACLE

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Jaedo Choi   Andrei A. Levchenko   Dimitrije Ruzic   Younghun Shim

Discussed by Seula Kim

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# Summary

Q: What is the role of top sales firms and market concentration in Korean economy?

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- Develop a quantitative macroeconomic model featuring:
  - Heterogeneous firm productivity and export demand (Melitz 2003)
  - Heterogeneous distortions (Hsieh and Klenow 2009)
  - Oligopolistic and oligopsonistic competition (Atkeson and Burstein 2008; Berger et al. 2022)

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  - Oligopolistic and oligopsonistic competition (Atkeson and Burstein 2008; Berger et al. 2022)
- Use firm-level data from South Korea to extract key primitives:
  - Productivity, distortions, export demand
- Decompose sectoral concentration into:
  - Top-3 firms' productivity, foreign market access, top firm turnover (entry/exit), sectoral reallocation
- Quantify the contribution of top-3 firms to real GDP and welfare

# MAIN FINDINGS

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  - 57% accounted for by sectoral reallocation
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## 2 Sectoral concentration has been rising

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## 3 Counterfactual of having the top-3 firms w/average shock process

- Market concentration is reduced
- Real GDP in 2011: 15% ↓
- NPV of Welfare over 1972-2011: 4% ↓
- Mostly from productivity shocks
- Samsung Electronics: real GDP 6.4%, welfare 1.04% ↓; Hyundai Motors: real GDP 1.1%, welfare 0.5% ↓

## Comments

# OVERVIEW

Super interesting & well-written paper!

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- Quantify the implications of top-3 firms and market concentration in the macroeconomy

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Some comments:

- 1 Validation of the Model & Estimates
- 2 Revisiting the Counterfactual Analysis
- 3 The Role of Firm Entry and Turnover
- 4 Further Investigation of the Top Firms

# VALIDATION OF THE MODEL & ESTIMATES

$$\max_{y_{ff}^H, y_{ff}^F, l_{ff}, k_{ff}, m_{ff}} p_{ff}^H y_{ff}^H + p_{ff}^F y_{ff}^F - (1 + \tau_{ff}^L) w_{ff} l_{ff} - (1 + \tau_{ff}^K) \rho k_{ff} - P_j^M m_{ff}$$

subject to

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- Labor, capital distortions  $\tau_{ff}^L, \tau_{ff}^K$

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
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$\Rightarrow \{a_{ff}, D_{ff}, \tau_{ff}^L, \tau_{ff}^K\}$  are recovered w/ the model solutions+data

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    - Demand shifters, factor quality, adjustment costs
    - Heterogeneity in factor demand and elasticities


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- Any relationships b/w measured  $a_{fj}$ ,  $D_{fj}$ ,  $\tau_{fj}^L$ ,  $\tau_{fj}^K$ ?
  - Can look into their corr. w/ firm age, size, growth, exit, etc. (by time, industry, cohort)
  - Any corr. b/w distortions & fundamentals?  
(e.g., size-dependent subsidy or regulation, subsidies to exporters, etc.)

# VALIDATION OF THE MODEL & ESTIMATES

- What are  $\tau_{fj}^L, \tau_{fj}^K$ ? How to think about them?
  - What happened in 1980s, 2000s?
  - Any candidates to fix our ideas?  
(e.g., government interventions favoring certain firms or sectors)
- Investigate historical policy changes and their corr. w/  $\tau_{fj}^L, \tau_{fj}^K$

# REVISITING THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS



Shocks	All shocks	Productivity	Foreign demand	Labor distortions	Capital distortions
	$a_{fjt}$	$D_{fjt}^a$	$D_{fjt}^K$	$1 + \tau_{fjt}^L$	$1 + \tau_{fjt}^K$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. Top 3 firms within sectors</i>					
$\Delta$ Welfare (%)	-4.10	-2.79	-0.68	-0.69	-0.54
<i>Panel B. Samsung Electronics</i>					
$\Delta$ Welfare (%)	-1.04	-0.96	-0.38	-0.01	-0.12
<i>Panel C. Hyundai Motors</i>					
$\Delta$ Welfare (%)	-0.49	-0.44	-0.08	-0.04	-0.02

⇒  $a_{fj}$   $D_{fj}$  are effective, but not so much for  $\tau_{fj}^L, \tau_{fj}^K$  (despite a large variation seen before)

# REVISITING THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS

- Construct counterfactual growth for top-3 firms

$$X_{fjt} = (1 + \hat{X}_{jt}^a) X_{fj,t-1}^c \text{ for } x_{fjt} \in \{a_{fjt}, D_{fjt}, 1 + \tau_{fjt}^L, 1 + \tau_{fjt}^K\}$$

where  $\hat{X}_{jt}^a = \sum_{f \in F_{jt}^a \cap F_{jt}^{cont,nz}} \frac{X_{fjt} - X_{fj,t-1}}{2(X_{fjt} + X_{fj,t-1})}$ : unweighted avg. growth amongst continuers by age bin

# REVISITING THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS

- What are the growth diffs. b/w top vs non-top firms?
  - Previous figures compared the levels over time
  - Systematically “increasing” dispersion in levels of  $a_{fjt}$ ,  $D_{fjt}$ , but not so much for  $\tau_{fjt}^L$ ,  $\tau_{fjt}^K$ ?

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  - Average across all vs. by age bins?

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  - Average across all vs. by age bins?
- How would the sample coverage affect the imputed series and implications?
  - KIS-VALUE firms are restricted to asset > 2.3 mil. USD
  - Missing firms (mostly small) may affect the imputed growth and implication
  - What if we consider small but productive firms?

# THE ROLE OF FIRM ENTRY AND TURNOVER

- Current model and analysis abstracts from firm entry or turnover
  - The number of oligopolistic firms is fixed ( $N$ )
  - No effective firm entry or exit
  - Current exercise is only through fringe firm adjustment


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  - The number of oligopolistic firms is fixed ( $N$ )
  - No effective firm entry or exit
  - Current exercise is only through fringe firm adjustment
- How does firm entry and dynamics interact with top firm activities and market concentration?
- How would the implications be affected with endogenous firm entry and turnover?
  - ⇒ The model can extend firm entry and exit
  - ⇒ Counterfactual analysis on firm entry, exit, reallocation, and welfare through them?

# FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TOP FIRMS

- Who are those top-3 firms? Basic statistics?
  - Age, size, revenue, TFPR, etc.
  - By continuers, entrants, exiters
  - Specific cohorts of firms? (e.g., HCI policy in 1970s)
  - In specific industries?
  - Dealing with multi-industry firms?
- Any anecdotal examples about their growth or relevant policy?

# FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TOP FIRMS



- Heterogeneity in top firms: what drives superstars vs. supervillains vs. others?
  - What is the distribution of  $\{a_{fj}, D_{fj}, \tau_{fj}^L, \tau_{fj}^K\}$  across them over time?
  - What is the source of their heterogeneity and distortions?
  - Any role of industrial policy?

# Conclusion

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## This paper:

- Documents a novel fact about rising concentration in South Korea
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- Quantify the role of top firms in real GDP and welfare
- Conclude the rise of large firms as a positive phenomenon!



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## Review:

- Promising paper: important question, tractable modeling, insightful results and implications
- Model and estimates validation need to be discussed
- Quantification analysis can be explored in depth
- Extension w/ firm entry, turnover
- Further details about top firms and summary statistics may help